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1. In tro d u ctio n
The Ecosystem Information System (EIS)[1, 2, 3] is a distributed database con
taining various types of information of interest to ecosystem modelers and m an
agers. Included in this database are m eta-data descriptions for various data sources,
datasets, and modeling components. EIS is designed and implemented using objectoriented technology. The current implementation of EIS implements only the “core
access technology” dem onstrating the potential for sharing interpreted objects via
EIS. B ut it does little or nothing at all in terms of security. Having come to a stage
where the software can now be used by ecosystem modelers to populate the database
so th a t it can be shared and accessed by other users on the network, data security
has become one of the key issues. The goal of EIS is to allow users anywhere on
the network to share distributed resources in a network-transparent manner. In a
distributed system, sharing of d ata and other resources is one of the key goals. But
while allowing users access to these resources, the distributed system should allow
each user to do those things th a t he/she is authorized to do, and to prevent him /her
from doing things th at are not authorized. The work described here is the objectoriented design and prototype implementation of this groupware layer for EIS, as an
extension to the current prototype system.
In this thesis, I discuss the three im portant aspects of the groupware layer in EIS
and present an object-oriented design of the different classes and objects th at encap
sulate these aspects. I perform a careful study of the different popular authentication
mechanisms available and present a viable authentication for EIS. The security mech
anism presented here is aimed at ensuring th at only the right users are allowed access
to the database and only those services and resources th at they are authorized to.
Since authentication needs to be done for every service requested by the user, it might
be b etter to cache the groupware information whenever a client is accessing a partic
ular portion of the groupware layer. The entire design process makes use of different
scenarios to help the designer analyse the effectiveness of a particular design aspect
1
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and the way to go around implementing it. The scenarios described in this thesis
should help th e reader understand the design concepts more clearly too.
Briefly summarized, the purpose of this thesis is to :
• design and implement a reliable security mechanism for a distributed system
like EIS.
• use object-oriented methodology in the design process.
• provide a strong authentication scheme to ensure that only the right users access
the EIS database resources.
• manage the costs involved in making the authentication/authorization requests.
• adopt a scenario-based object-diagram representation to describe how objects
will interact with each other during program execution.

2. B ackground
2.1 A n O verview o f O b ject-O rien ted M od elin g
O bject-oriented design is built upon a sound engineering foundation, whose ele
m ents we collectively call the object model [4], The object model encompasses the
principles of abstraction, encapsulation, modularity, hierarchy, concurrency, and per
sistence. The building blocks in any object-oriented design methodology are concepts
of class, instance(or object) and method. A class is a description of objects that
share a common structure and a common behavior. An object is simply an instance
of a class. An object can be considered to have state, behavior and identity. The
state of an object is determ ined by a set of attributes of the object plus the current
values of each of these attributes. In general, the internal state of an object is hid
den from other objects and hence is not directly accessible.,However an object can
m ake parts of its state available to other objects or let other objects perform actions
on this state through a set of visible attributes and operations. The client/server
model is a good example of an object-oriented modelling where the two main objects
under consideration are the client and the server processes. The client/server model
is used to describe the use of networks containing two types of processes th at have
an asymm etric relationship. The client process makes requests for services and the
server provides the services on request. Objects th at share common attributes and
operations are grouped into a class.
Object-Oriented design[4] is an incremental, iterative process in which the prod
ucts o f ’design, a set of interacting objects, gently unfold over time. We start the
object-oriented design process by discovering the classes and objects th at form the
vocabulary of our problem domain. The process of object-oriented design generally
tracks the following order of events:
• Identify the key abstractions in the problem space (the significant classes and
objects) and describe the mechanisms th at provide the behaviour required of
3
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objects, so th at they can work together to achieve some function.
• Identify the semantics of these classes and objects.
• Identify the relationship among these classes and objects.
• Implement these classes and objects.
This is an increm ental process: the identification of new classes and objects usually
results in the need to refine and improve upon the semantics ofand relationships
among existing classes and objects. It is also an iterative process: implementing
classes and objects often leads us to the discovery or invention of new classes and
objects whose presence simplifies and generalizes our design.
Given an object-oriented design for a target system, the next step is to somehow
test the design, prior to implementation, to see if it provides the correct set of facil
ities. A scenario is a description of how objects will interact with each other during
program execution to perform a specific activity. A scenario can be represented in
m any different ways, but one of the most convenient representations is as a diagram
showing objects and the exchange of operation calls and results th at represent their
client/server relationship in this particular scenario.
For a client/server system such as EIS, a set of carefully selected scenarios can help
the system designer to visualize different approaches and determ ine the correctness
of the design, its efficiency and how it would function in a real implementation.

2.2 G oal for EIS
Modern ecosystem management and analysis is an application area th a t demands
extensive information sharing between different organizations and different sites within
an organization. The goal of the EIS project is to create a network-accessible reposi
tory of ecosystem information th at provides access to various types of information of
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interest to ecosystem modelers and managers in a user-friendly manner, ensures rea
sonable security, allows the distribution of locally created m aterial and contribution
from outside users, and is populated with m aterial sufficient to illustrate both its use
and its value to potential users. The second m ajor goal in EIS development is to en
hance the level of access provided by Internet-based tools for objects such as numerical
datasets, program components and m eta-data descriptions for various data sources.
Currently available Internet tools support the display of hypertext documents and
images in standard formats, but provide access to other types of objects merely as
uninterpreted files. Our goal is to develop tools th at allow us to construct a web-work
of hierarchical dataset descriptions and dataset instances, allowing a potential user to
transparently navigate from site to site, browse through dataset descriptions, locate
datasets and d ata transformations of interest, and easily add datasets and dataset
descriptions.

2.3 O b je c t- O rie n te d D esig n o f E IS
The base EIS object-oriented design (referred to as EIS 0.9) implements the core
of inform ation distribution functionality, but without any access control or other
mechanism for security.

An object diagram of the EIS 0.9 design is depicted in

Figure 1. The core system consists of five prim ary types of one-per-user or one-perhost objects th at implement the necessary services. The three one-per-user objects
G U I, O M E a n d O R B -c lie n t are encapsulated under one object called E lS -c lie n t.
ElS-client is invoked as a client process by a user.

On every host, the one-per-

host objects - O b je c t R e q u e s t B ro k e r (O R B -s e rv e r) and O b je c t D a ta b a s e
M a n a g e r (O D B M ) are encapsulated under the E lS -se rv e r. At the heart of the
ElS-server are two one-per-host objects. The ORB-server manages locally generated
requests, and resolves such requests by forwarding them to either the local filesystem
or to the ORB-server on a remote host. Thus the ORB-server must also respond to
remotely generated object requests for objects stored on its local database. The ORB-
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server also manages all communication required to store and retrieve information from
th e local file system, phrased in terms of messages/responses with the ODBM. The
ODBM encapsulates all aspects of file system storage, thus hiding details associated
w ith file naming, directory structure, etc.
The ElS-Client is a set of three one-per-user objects, namely GUI, OME and
ORB-client. The user-interface, which involves the X /M otif details, is encapsulated
in the GUI. The GUI maintains only enough local state to allow the display to be
drawn.

In order to allow efficient implementation of operations th at modify the

display another object, the Object Management Engine (OME), m aintains a more
complete local state. Thus, the class hierarchy is represented in different forms and
in different degrees of detail in different objects. To m aintain the local state, the
OME uses several smaller objects which are all encapsulated in the OME for our
explaination here. The OME routes all its requests for EIS database entities to the
ORB-Client, which in turn forwards each request through the ORB-Server to either
the local ODBM or across the network to another ORB-Server.
The EIS 0.9 has been implemented in C + + , with the GUI front-end w ritten using
X/M otif. A public-domain remote procedure call mechanism (SUN RPC) is used for
host/host communication. This initial implementation executes on the IBM RS/6000
Unix workstations. The code should be portable to a wide range of Unix worksta
tions within the portatbility bounds of different C + + compilers, X /M otif library
im plem entations, and the SUN RPC. However, the prototype EIS 0.9 implements
only the core access technology demonstrating the potential for sharing interpreted
objects via EIS. Since the remote procedure call mechanism used is w ritten in C,
a encode/decode m ethod has to be used to convert the C + + objects into a format
acceptable to the RPC library. All this is encapsulated within the ORB-Client and
ORB-Server. The present implementation of EIS does not yet provide support for ro
bust operation, group-oriented security, or other forms of access regulation. The EIS
data-repository is organised hierarchically using an object-oriented framework to or

der the myriad collection of components used in ecosystem modeling. In collaboration
with other ecosystem modeling laboratories, the repository is being populated with
datasets and modeling tools from im portant ecosystem modeling and management
applications.
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3. T h e G roupw are Layer
3.1 R eq u irem en ts
In a distributed system, sharing of data and other resources is one of the key goals.
But while allowing users access to these resources, it is im portant to make sure th at
distributed system resources are accessed only by those who are authorized to do so
and only in precisely the ways they are authorized to do so. The im plem entation of
EIS has reached a stage where the database is being populated with information by
ecosystem researchers from our collaborating laboratories. Before people start using
EIS extensively, the prim ary need is to design and implement the groupware layer
appropriate for EIS. The design of the security system for a distributed system like EIS
is significantly different from th at for a uniprocessor system. A user could be anybody
on the network. An EIS group could consist of users from a range of hosts. The
access privileges to a hierarchy could be more detailed than the (read, w r ite , execute)
accesses as described in the Unix system. The owner of a hierarchy should probably
be able to specify the access groups for each/som e of the groups defined. Also since
parts of a hierarchy could be contributed by a certain group of users, they ought to
be able to set authorization on their parts of the hierarchy for other users.
Ideally there would be a system supported layer of client/server facilities th at
allowed servers to “publish” their services yet restrict access to them , and clients to
identify themselves and gain access to these services. The D istributed Computing
Environm ent (DCE)[6] is a convenient tool for such purposes. The set of DCE Se
curity Service facilities provides a robust set of capabilities to ensure th a t services
are m ade available only to properly designated parties, without inconveniencing le
gitim ate users. DCE Security implementation is based on Kerberos[7, 8] and uses
very well known encryption algorithms (D ata Encryption Standard - DES). An ideal
situation would be to implement EIS using DCE distributed support for security. B ut
unfortunately, while DCE is fast becoming a standard, it is still not widely available
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nor completely compatible across different vendor platforms. In order to perm it the
im plem entation and use of EIS now, our plan is to implement EIS using the SUN
RPC [5] which is a public-domain software portable and compatible across a wide
range of Unix Workstations. As regards security, the disadvantage is th at the SUN
RPC offers an authentication scheme which cannot provide a high level of security
for an arbitrary design. The complete functional design of EIS demands this level
of security for its groupware scheme. The work described here includes the complete
EIS groupware design, and a modified, more limited form th at can be implemented
securely with only RPC support.
There are three facets of the proposed groupware layer: authentication, autho
rization, and access control. The three “As” work together to provide security in
EIS. A uthentication means validating the user’s identity. Authorization means deter
mining to what groups this user belongs. Access control is deciding the set of access
privileges this user should and should not be allowed. The authorization and access
control decisions in the EIS distributed system are encapsulated in the ElS-server.
For every operation th at a user requests, the ElS-client authenticates the user (deter
mines the user’s identity), authorizes the user’s membership, then verifies from the
concerned ElS-server if the user has the right to perform the access implied by the
requested service. Only at the end of this process is the user allowed to perform the
requested action.
There is overhead in making authentication/authorization/access requests.

In

general, information required to resolve these requests may be stored globally, so the
overhead is passed along to the concerned ElS-server. If the server is rem ote from the
originating user, considerable performance delays could result. Since such requests
are m ade for every operation requested by the client, the groupware layer is likely to
be the most frequently used resource in EIS.
There are three m ajor issues to be addressed in the groupware implementation.
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First is managing the costs involved in resolving the 3-A requests. Second is rec
ognizing the level of security and functionality th at can be attained without true
distributed system support for security, i.e. using only RPC. The third is balancing
communication and d ata replication in the design of features to support the 3-A’s.
Keeping only a single copy of the pertinent groupware data will lead to excessive
communication costs, whereas replicating the data at each client might lead to an
inconsistency between the replicated groupware data thereby leading ,to erroneous
results. An appropriate balance between centralized and replication schemes, as de
scribed in [9, 10], m ust be designed to make the 3-A implementation efficient, reliable
and robust.
Actually integrating a well thought-out groupware layer with the existing system
code will be the final step. All of the new objects are encapsulated within the server,
only requiring changes in the ORB-client and ORB-server to handle the communica
tion requests and minor new GUI capability for operations concerning the groupware
layer. We shall identify this new EIS system with the groupware layer with a new
version num ber (EIS 1.0) in order to distinguish the new EIS from the existing system
(EIS 0.9).

3.2 B a sic E n tities
Logically, the groupware layer is based on a collection of classes th at define the
characteristics of active entities such as users, hosts, and groups, of permissions, and
of privileges. These classes are defined below, followed by a discussion on the pro
cedure used in EIS 1.0 in handling the 3-A aspects of Authentication, Authorization
and Access Control. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the classes th at encapsulate these def
initions. Figure 2 describes the abstractions th at encapsulate concepts related to
authentication and authorization. Figure 3 is a description of the abstractions th at
encapsulate key concepts in defining access permissions. Figure 4 shows the different
classes of users in the EIS system, based on their access privileges. A single instance
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of groupJnfo will encapsulate the authentication and authorization operations for a
group of hosts. An instance of privJnfo will encapsulate the permissions for different
groups for each hierarchy, and hence is used for access control.
Figure 5 also suggests where the different parts of the groupware layer fit into the
EIS system. Logically, the EIS system as a whole consists of a num ber of cells. Each
cell in made up of a set of hosts. Ideally a host belongs within only one cell but it
can be otherwise. One host in each cell is designated as the cell’s m ainserver which
is very much like the other EIS servers except that it encapsulates the groupJnfo and
the hierJdJist for th at cell. The groupJnfo defines a set of groups for the cell and the
scope of a group includes all the hosts within the cell. Every EIS host m aintains a
database of all the hierarchies th at were created on that host. For example, in Figure
5, the hierarchies H I E R m i indicates that this hierarchy is one of the hierarchies
stored on host M. Hierarchies are identified by names th at are unique within the
domain of a cell. Along with each hierarchy, we have a privJnfo object th at keeps
track of the access permissions for different groups to the hierarchy.

3 .3 A n E x a m p le groupJnfo O b je c t
An example instance of groupJnfo is shown in Figure 6 to better illustrate how
the objects are organized. Cell A is one of the cells in the EIS system as depicted in
Figure 5. The groupJnfo consists of:
1. A list of groups (EIS-ADMIN, dasl, eis) and the users belonging to each of these
groups
2. A list of vita with a cross reference indicating the list of groups each user belongs
to.

This instance of groupJnfo for cell A is encapsulated within the m ainserver for the
cell, host “cs.um t.edu”. Suppose now, user “trish@ radiator.cs.umt.edu” creates a hi-
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C lass

A ttr ib u te s D escrip tio n

u ser

email-id

Since EIS can be accessed from anywhere on the network,
we define a EIS user as a person with a valid email account
on a Unix system. Hence a user’s attribute is the
email-id of the account.

h ost

IP address

An EIS host is a host on which an EIS server
runs as a daemon process.

cell

list< host>

A cell in EIS terms is a group of co-operating EIS hosts, each
running its own EIS server. Each cell has a designated mainserver
host which has the extra attributes described below.

grou p

group-name,
list<user>

A group encapsulates a group _name and a list of users
that belong to the group.

v ita

user,
list<group>

A vita is defined as the list of groups that a user belongs to.
It consists of a user attribute and a list<groups attribute.

grou p _info

eis _admin,
list<group>,
list<vita>

This contains the information describing which user belongs
to each group and what groups each user belongs to. This
object encapsulates the authorization process of the groupware
layer. The list<vita> is a cross-reference to the list<group> so
that the authorization process is faster and more efficient.
There should be only one groupJnfo object per EIS cell.

E IS -serv er

Hierarchies

This is the EIS server process that runs as a one-per-host daemon
process. It handles requests from EIS clients and manages the databas

m ain _server Hierarchies,

hierarchy-list,
groupJnfo

The mainserver in a cell is different from the other
EIS servers in that it encapsulates a few additional objects that
are absent in other servers. These attributes are the groupJnfo and
hierarchyJist{a table of all the hierarchies within the cell).

Figure 2: Abstractions encapsulating A uthentication/A uthorization
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C lass

A ttr ib u te s

D escrip tio n

p riv J n fo

owner-id, owner_perms,
world_perms, list<group_perms>

PrivJnfo is the object that keeps access
right information for different privilege
classes.

p erm s

read, modify, modify Jf_extended,
This object contains the different
delete, deleteJd.extended, extend, execute access rights defineable in a EIS hierarchy,

g ro u p .p e rm groupname, perms

The permissions for a group.

Figure 3: Abstractions encapsulating Access Control

C lass

A ttr ib u te s and d escrip tion

P rivilege C lasses The Privilege classes within EIS are EIS_Admin[Root], Owner,
Group(s), World. The EIS J\.dmin is the only class of user(s) who are privileged to ac
cess/modify the groupJnfo Every hierarchy has a Owner who can change/add/delete
the permission attribute of any of the groups. Each of the different groups including
the world can be set to have different access rights.

Figure 4: Privilege Classes
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Figure 5: EIS Object-oriented diagram including the Groupware Layer
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EIS.ADMIN: venu@eisgate.cs.umt.edu, vijayant@eisgate.cs.umt.edu

/* a group */

dasl: ford@cs.umt.edu, trish@radiator.cs.umt.edu, ford@wilfred.umt.edu

/* a group */

eis: righter@wru.umt.edu, dthompsn@cs.umt.edu , ford@wilfred.umt.edu

/* a group */

venu@eisgate.cs.umt.edu: EIS-ADMIN

/* a vita

7
a vita 7
a vita 7
a vita 7
a vita 7

trish@radiator.cs.umt.edu: dasl

r
r
/*
r
r a vita */

righter@wru.umt.edu: eis

/* a vita

vijayant@eisgate.cs.umt.edu: EIS-ADMIN
ford@cs.umt.edu: dasl
ford@wilfred.umt.edu: dasl, eis
dthompsn@cs.umt.edu: eis

Figure 6: An example groupJnfo instance for cell A

7
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G roup N a m e

P er m issio n s

owner < trish@r adiat or.cs.umt .edu >

r d-m-ex

eis

r—-ex

world

r------

Figure 7: PrivJnfo for hierarchy habitat-type
erarchy nam ed habitat-type on host “radiator.cs.um t.edu”. Then “trish@ radiator.cs.um t.edu”
becomes the owner of hierarchy “habitat-type” . Either the owner or the EIS-ADMIN
can specify access permissions to “habitat_type” for different groups. An example
privJnfo for “habitat_type” is as shown in Figure 7.

3 .4 EIS D a ta b a se O rganization
In this section, we discuss scenarios that illustrate the client/server (object) in
teraction used to implement the basic services provided in EIS. These scenarios are
im portant because they help to illustrate the database organization and reflect upon
the way the groupware authentication is designed.
Consider some cell C, in which the main.server is S m • The m ainserver S m con
tains a “hierarchy list” which m aintains a list of all hierarchies created within the cell
domain. For every hierarchy th at is created, there is a minJnfo object th at maintains
links to all the classes, instances and methods th at together form the hierarchy. The
m inJnfo is encapsulated in the database on the host where the hierarchy was origi
nally created. T hat is when a new hierarchy “H i ” is created, its minJnfo

is

stored on the local host’s database and a link to the hierarchy’s minJnfo “771:rnm” is
planted in the “hierarchy list” m aintained on the m ainserver for the cell. Individual
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Host L
User X

/\

Client C

Server S|_

1.

Save mindnfo for hierarchy Hi

2.

Server S l records the mindnfo for H\ in its database

3.

Server S l requests Sm to add a link to Hi in the hierarchy list

4. & 5. return ACK.

Figure 8: Create and Save a Hierarchy Hi
class, instance and method definitions that are subsequently added to the hierarchy
are encapsulated on the host where they are created. Everytime a class, instance or
m ethod is defined th at extends a hierarchy, the object’s description (called maxdnfo
for the object) is stored on the local database. A link to the object’s maxdnfo along
with some minim al information about the relationship of this object with other ob
jects in the hierarchy is planted in the hierarchy’s mindnfo

Thus whenever

a new object is defined on host L for a hierarchy originally created on host K, the ob
ject definition is stored on L and a link to this definition is created in the hierarchy’s
mindnfo object on host K.
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Host A

Host L

Client Ci

Client C|_

erY

/\

User X

/\

Server S|_

Server S^

1.

Store the maxJnfo for the new class on the local database.

2.

Add a link to the minJnfo of H\ on host L’s database.

3. & 4. return ACK.

Figure 9: Extend a Subclass to hierarchy H\
Figure 8 depicts the scenario where user X on host L creates a hierarchy H\. The
client C l makes a request to its local server S i to save the minJnfo for Hi on host
L. The server also connects to the cell main server, S m , to update the cell hierarchy
list to add a link to the new hierarchy H \ .
Figure 9 describes a scenario where another user Y on some other host A adds a
subclass to the hierarchy H\. At the tim e of executing this service request, the user
would have already loaded the minJnfo for Hi. When the user adds the new subclass,
a request is sent to S a to add the maxJnfo for the extended class on 5V s database.
Subsequently, S a sends a request “add a link to the new class” to the server “5V'\
which will update the minJnfo for H \ .

4. T h e 3-A A sp e c ts o f th e G roupw are Layer
4.1 U ser A u th en tica tio n
Authentication is a process of verifying a user’s identity. A uthentication is the
foundation of groupware security.

Only if we can be sure of who we are talking

to can any other security features be of any value. Authentication is the groupware
mechanism most different from mechanisms used in monolithic systems, and the most
complex part of the groupware layer. Hence a careful study of the authentication
process in the EIS groupware is essential. The problem we need to solve is to guarantee
th a t the EIS design and implementation satisfies following conditions:
• No activity by a rogue process (user/server/m ain server) should corrupt the
database of any EIS server.
• No activity by a rogue process should plant a link in a valid database th at
when subsequently accessed allows the rogue to obtain rights or privileges on
. the requestor, or to corrupt data on the requestor.
A couple of popular solutions possible in the UNIX client/server domain are ex
plained here. We shall later discuss the viable alternatives for authentication in EIS
in section 4.2. In a network environment, it is difficult to determ ine the exact iden
tity of a user on a remote host. In most client/server implementations of processes
such as “rlogin” or “rsh” , the client and server code on a host are owned by the root
user of the host. The “rlogin” command logs a user into a specific remote host and
attem pts to connect the user initiating the rlogin request to the remote host. The
“rsh” command attem pts to execute the specified command on the rem ote host on
behalf of the user initiating the request. Both “rlogin” and “rsh” are client/server
implem entations where the server runs as a daemon process waiting for client requests
and th e client is executed whenever a user issues the command. A user on a host
can tell the rlogin and rsh daemons to allow some users log into their accounts di
rectly w ithout prom pting them for a password while preventing all other users from
20
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logging in without entering the correct password. The client code can be executed by
any normal user. A user executing this code tem porarily becomes “root”, and thus
tem porarily gains privileges allowing the execution of root operations like reading
kernel files or binding the client to a reserved socket port. However it is im portant
to note th a t it is the process executing this code th at gains “root” privileges though
it is executed by any normal user. Hence as long as the integrity of the executable
allowing tem porary root privileges is guaranteed, we can ensure th at a normal user
cannot do anything rogueish.
The authentication mechanism explained here pertains to the implem entation
used in standard Unix Network software such as “rlogin”. A detailed study of the
im plem entation of Unix Network Programming is discussed in [8]. W hen a socket
connection is established by th e client with a remote server, the server can request
the port and machine address of the live connection1. Since only root processes
can bind to a reserved socket port, the server process can verify if the connection is
established with a client process th at has root privileges on a trusted host. A rogue
can modify the client code and try to do something rogish. However if the rogue is
not root, the rogue’s code will not have root privileges and hence will not be able to
bind to a reserved socket port. In such a protocol, there is a potential problem since
the server m ust trust the root on a remote site. This is quite acceptable since the
client can do nothing to harm the server host as long as the client is not granted the
unusual privileges by the server (in the rlogin example, the “.rhosts” file determines
a rem ote client’s privileges).
The authentication mechanism explained in the above paragraph cannot be adopted
into EIS for the following reasons. Since EIS is still in a developmental stage, it is
arguably b etter not to install the EIS client and server code as root processes with
full root privileges (most often, the servers are the entry-points for Internet rogues.).
1The Unix system call g e tp e e r n a m e Q returns the foreign machine’s IP address and the port
number to which the foreign process is connected
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Since the source code for EIS is to be freely distributed, trusting the client process
could be disastrous. An alternative would be to use the information provided by the
id e n t facility to identify the owner of each client process requesting server access. As
per the RFC 931 protocol, id e n t provides a reasonably good way of authenticating a
user. It requires th a t both machines engaged in the client/server connection must run
the identity daemon id e n td process in the background. The server upon receiving
requests from a client, then connects to the identd daemon on the host where the
client process is running to verify the user’s identity.
U nfortunately there are problems with ident which make it unacceptable for use
in authentication in EIS. Firstly, the identd daemon has to be a root process, since it
reads kernel files (/dev/km em ) to determ ine which user is connected to a given port.
As such it should be started by the inetd daemon. Secondly, there is a significant
am ount of communication overhead (end_server

identd daemon) needed just for

authentication purposes. Also while identd works to authenticate local/rem ote re
quests, it does not help local host authentication in any way. Finally, use of ident is
gaining popularity, but it is still not an accepted standard and hence not all systems
support it yet. To simulate identd functionality within the EIS server process is also
not possible since the process would need to read kernel files which are readable only
by the root.

4.2 A u th e n tic a tio n in E IS
As depicted in Figure 1, an EIS server interacts directly with either clients on the
same host or another server on a remote host which issues requests on behalf of some
client on th at host. Given such a situation, the problem is to identify appropriate
m ethods to verify the trustworthiness of a remote server and a local client so as to
ensure the validity of the conditions described above.
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4 .2 .1 Local C lient A u th en tica tio n
In EIS, a client directly connects to the server on its host for every request it
needs processed. As long as we assume th at the server on th at host is trustworthy,
this helps us in the authentication process. W ith every request generated by the client
th a t needs authentication, the EIS client determines the user’s identity arid passes it
to the local server, which verifies the validity of the user information by looking in
the local process table. Since the client/server connection pertains to the same host,
external “spoofing” can be ruled out. This authentication m ethod of a local client
process helps identify exactly the user issuing the client request and hence satisfies
the conditions set forth above in this section.
4 .2 .2 R e m o te Server A u th en tica tio n
Rem ote server authentication is more difficult to attain in the EIS system because
of the following reasons:
1. Neither the SUN RPC nor the socket system calls provide any means of iden
tifying the caller user’s identity. There are provisions to determine the remote
host’s IP address and the port to which the caller is connected; However it is
not possible to determ ine who the calling user is.
2. EIS 0.9 should not be run as a root process, and hence cannot take advantage
authentication mechanisms th at require root access.
3. The ultim ate goal is to use a DCE-based implementation to provide a reliable
security mechanism. EIS should not be based on elaborate ad hoc solutions in
the interim.
Since our main aim is to ensure th at no operation by any user of EIS 1.0 corrupts
the database in any way, the following approach is suggested:
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• All EIS adm inistrators m ust be valid users on the m ainserver of the cell. We
restrict certain EIS admin operations, so th at all admin-related operations (c re 
a te /r e m o v e a g ro u p , a d d /d e le te u se rs fro m a g ro u p ) must be requested
from the mainserver.
• Any user who is authorized with re a d , e x te n d /e x e c u te privileges on a hierar
chy can read the hierarchy. In order to delete/modify a subclass/instance/m ethod,
the user m ust not only have the right privileges, but m ust also execute the
delete/modify commands from the same host on which the objects were created
(i.e. the user has to be “local” to that host).
• No user from some host can effect a delete/modify operation on an object created
on some other host, even though the user belongs to a group th a t is authorized
with delete/m odify privileges.
• For all other services requested by a remote user, EIS will normally trust the
authentication information received from the remote host and cross-check only
to verify the host IP address of the connecting client.
As explained in section 4.2.1, we can authenticate with certainty any user on the
local host. However, when a request is made across the network, the system is more
vulnerable to external spoofing and the different alternatives discussed earlier fail to
ensure a sure-proof authentication mechanism. The above approach takes the firm
stance of lim iting the access privileges of outside users and simply denies outside
users the right to delete/m odify classes/instances/methods, because such operations
can affect the local database. Yet, this does not mean th at we are over-protective
of the database information. For most services available in EIS, we normally tru s t2
the authentication information provided by the remote server. Any user with the
appropriate access can request and use “read & extend” services normally.

The

2We still check the socket connection to verify the IP address of the host the server is connected
to.
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extra precautions in the case of m odify/delete services are used to ensure th at only
the “right” persons modify local databases.

This approach also avoids extensive

performance penalty for authentication, since there are no repeated calls back and
forth ju st for authentication purposes.
W ith this authentication scheme, we control “write” access to the database. How
ever, a rogue user can still extend objects to a hierarchy or an entire hierarchy to a
system th at had no business being there. Under normal circumstances, we can assume
th a t everything runs ok and th at an EIS user has no malicious intent. But there are
several issues we need to consider more carefully.
1.

An EIS A dm inistrator controls EIS information on a cell (a group of hosts).

Suppose some rogue user creates a hierarchy Hi on some host B in the cell. The ad
m inistrator sitting on the mainserver's host M is an external user to any information
on host B and hence has lim ited access to the hierarchy Hi on host B. We noted in
section 3.4 th a t the main.server maintains links to all the hierarchies (called hierar
chy list) created within the cell it encapsulates. Any user who wishes to open/use a
hierarchy has to first retrieve this hierarchy list and traverse the link to the appro
priate hierarchy. As a solution to the above problem, the A dm inistrator can choose
to remove the link to the hierarchy Hi from the hierarchy list and control the user’s
access rights to the cell.
2. A nother problem occurs when a rogue user extends objects to a hierarchy cre
ated by some other user. The owner of the hierarchy has the access rights to decide
who can extend objects to the hierarchy and who cannot.

But as in the previ

ous case, if an object is already extended by a rogue user on some other host, the
owner of the hierarchy cannot remove these objects physically from the database
since now he is not a trusted user on the other host. Again, the solution in this case
is similar to the one discussed for the previous problem. W ith every hierarchy, we
m aintain an object called minJnfo which resides on the database of the host where
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th e hierarchy was created. The minJnfo object m aintains links to all the different
classes/instances/m ethods extended to the hierarchy, along with some minim al infor
m ation of how the classes/instances/methods relate to one another in the hierarchy.
Every tim e someone extends a class/instance/m ethod to a hierarchy, the information
the object carries is stored on the local database of the host where the object was cre
ated and a link to the object information is placed in the m inJnfo object. The owner
of the hierarchy controls the minJnfo object though he has no control to the physical
information of the extended object. He could remove the link to the extended object.
This could get complicated when a scenario given in Figure 10 develops. Classes C l,
C2 and C3 are valid classes added to hierarchy i / 2- Now a rogue user extends a class
C4 and instance II to the class C3 as shown in the figure. If later some other user
extends a class C5 to C4, then removing the link to C4 becomes non-trivial since it
has some valid sub-class(es) C5 which should still continue to exist. Here the owner of
the hierarchy can choose to either hide just C4 and II so that they are not accessible
by any user, or remove the sub-tree starting at node C4 so th at links to all objects
in the sub-tree are lost, or move the sub-class C5 to some safe parent class and then
remove the links to C4 and II.

4.3 A u th o riza tio n
As we explained earlier when defining the groupware classes and objects, the ob
ject th at encapsulates the authorization process in EIS is groupJnfo. Authorization is
a process of determ ining the different groups the user belongs to. Once the authenti
cation procedure is done correctly, to authorize a user, we have to make a connection
to the m ainserver of the cell3. The m ainserver requests its group Jnfo object to
return a list of groups to which the user is a member.
3If a copy of the cell’s group Jn fo already exists on this site, then this process is much simpler
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Class C1

Class C3

Class C2

Class C4

instance 11

Class C5

Class C4 and Instance II exhibit ‘rogue-ish’ behaviour.

Solutions:
1. Hide the sub-tree rooted at Class C4.
2. Delete the sub-tree rooted at Class C4. Implication of 1 & 2: Valid class C5 is
not accessible anymore.
3. Make Class C3 the parent of C5 and delete the sub-tree now rooted a,t Class
C4.

Figure 10: An example rogueish behaviour
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4.4 A ccess Control
Access Control is a per-hierarchy operation. A group can have different access
privileges to different hierarchies within a cell. Each hierarchy encapsulates the object
(priv-info) th a t keeps of the permissions for different groups. After determining the
different groups for a user, we look up the privJnfo4 object to verify each group’s
permissions to the hierarchy. The user’s access rights are a union of the access rights
of all th e groups to which he belongs.

4The priv J n fo object physically exists on the host where the hierarchy was created.

5. S cen arios
We shall use a scenario-based examination to see how the groupware layer fits into
the EIS system. A scenario is a description of how objects interact with each other
while performing a specific activity. A scenario can be represented in many different
ways, but one of the most convenient representations is as a diagram showing objects
and the exchange of operation calls/value returns. Such a diagram represents the
client/server relationship in this particular scenario.

5.1 N o ta tio n s
We shall adopt th e following notational convention in describing the scenarios:

Client C n '

The EIS client process 1 on host I

Server S i :

The EIS server process (one per host) on host I

Sm -

The designated m ainserver iov the concerned cell

Sr :

A remote server in the cell from which a hierarchy is
being retrieved.

L:

The local host from where the user is operating.

The arrows in the scenario-based diagrams indicate th at the object pointed to is being
requested for a resource/action by the object from where the arrow is originating. We
also denote the sequence of events by marking the arrows with numbers. For example,
an event marked 3 occurs earlier than one marked 5. The exact action th at occurs on
the event is shown separately at the bottom of the diagram, referenced by the event
number. The sections below discuss the finer points of the scenarios depicted in the
figures.
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5.2 B a sic D esign
In all the scenarios presented in this section, every request involving remote data
access generated by a client on some host L is sent first to the server S l on the same
host, then subsequently from S l to the remote server. There are a few advantages
of passing requests through the local server S l rather than having the client connect
directly to the rem ote server. The first advantage is th at the server on the same
machine can verify if the client caller is really the user th at he claims to be. This
helps ‘strengthen’ the authentication process against users trying to spoof the system.
Secondly, the local server can be designed to m aintain a cache of rem ote group Jn fo and
privJnfo objects th at are frequently accessed. Group Jnfo and privJnfo are the objects
most frequently accessed within the EIS system and such a cache could dram atically
reduce network loading and on remote servers. Caching this information at the local
server whenever necessary helps speed further accesses to these objects while at the
same tim e not compromising on security by preventing the client direct access to this
information.
Unfortunately, although caching group Jnfo and privJnfo at different servers where
they are being used greatly helps in reducing network traffic, it also introduces some
problems. The first and most im portant of these relates to authentication. By caching
groupware information on a remote host, we are trusting a remote server to provide a
valid authentication. This works as long as the rem ote server is trustworthy. But the
rem ote server could also be a rogue th at provides false information. The authentica
tion scheme presented in section 4.2 tells not to trust a remote user or server when
any service with write or modify privileges is requested. The authentication scheme
restricts write and modify services to only privileged users on the local host. Thus we
are not forced (or allowed) to tru st remote servers.
Another problem relates to consistency and concurrency issues. Appropriate steps
need to be taken in order to m aintain consistency between the different copies of a
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replicated object whenever the object is updated at any of the sites. The scenarios
th a t follow deal with these issues and propose a method of dealing with the consistency
issues.

5.2.1 C reate a G roup
A scenario for group creation is shown in Figure 11. We assume th at the domain
of this operation is restricted to the current cell under consideration. In order to
perform this operation, the user has to be the EIS Adm inistrator for the cell. As we
discussed earlier in section 4.2, an EIS Adm inistrator has to be a valid login account
on the m ainserver of the cell. This way, the authentication is fool-proof. The scenario
indicates the order in which the authentication/authorization routines are performed.
The EIS client C l i identifies the user performing the action and sends the request to
the server on its machine S l - The server S l verifies th at the requestor is really the
person he claims to be. This is the authentication process. An outline of the algorithm
used to verify the user’s identity is shown in Figure 1 in appendix A. The server checks
to see if server S l is the m ainserver itself. Since the authentication verifies if the
client C l i was running on the same host L, this check helps determ ine if the client
C li is running on the mainserver. The mainserver then looks up the group.info
object in its database to see if the user is an adm inistrator. This is the authorization
process. If the authorization process returns a positive acknowledgement, only then
is the newly created group is effected on the group Jnfo object in the database.

5.2.2 O pen a H ierarchy
Figure 12 illustrates execution of the “Get-Hierarchy” operation. S r is the server
on the site where the hierarchy is stored. Server S m is the m ainserver of the cell
including host R. The OME object in the client C l i has knowledge of where the
requested hierarchy exists on the network. C li sends a request to its local server S l
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C lie n t Cj_

Server Sl

1. Create_Group(myid, A)
2. if authenticate(myid) th e n /* verify if the userid myid is local and valid */
if S l = S m th en
if myid = admin and group A does not exist already th en
begin
create_group(A);
ack = OK;
return(ack);
end
ack = PERMISSION-DENIED;
return(ack);
3 . return(ack);

Figure 11: Scenario: Create a Group
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Server S.
Client C|^

Server S

Server S^

1. Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R)
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK th e n /* verify if the userid myid is local and valid */
if group Jnfo and HIER.privJnfo copies exist in the cache then
if authorize(uid, READ) = OK then
/* forward request to host R to retrieve hierarchy’s minJnfo */
Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R);
else return PERMISSION-DENIED;
else Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R);
3. if verify_client_host(uid.host_address) = OK then
groupJnfo = get-groupJnfo(M);
4. /* Server S m notes that server S l will keep a copy of groupJnfo */
group Jnfo.sit e-list .add (L);
re t urn(group Jnfo);
5. if authorize(uid, READ) = OK then
begin
/* Server S r notes that server S l will keep a copy of HIER.privJnfo */
HIER.privJnfo.siteJist.add(L);
return(m inJnfo, groupJnfo, HIER.privJnfo);
end
else return PERMISSION-DENIED;
6. HIER.priv Jnfo.site = R; /* Server S l notes the site of the original copies */
groupJnfo.site = M;
copy groupJnfo and HIER.privJnfo on local database;
7. return(m inJnfo);

Figure 12: Scenario: Open a hierarchy ‘H IER’
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passing as arguments the requesting user’s identification, the name of the hierarchy
requested and the site from where to receive the hierarchy. The local server first
executes the authentication algorithm to verify the user’s identity. The local server
then tries to determ ine if the groupware information for the hierarchy already exists in
th e cache. If a reference is found, the client is authorized and his access control verified
at the locaLserver. If the authorization/access_control operations fail to validate the
user, then a negative acknowledgement is sent back to the user immediately and the
service request ignored. If however, the user passes the authorization test on the
locaLserver or there is no groupware information stored in the cache, the request is
forwarded to th e rem ote server S r . S r requests its m ainserver to authorize the user
(determ ine all the groups to which the user belongs). S r then checks if any of these
groups are privileged with read permissions on the hierarchy. If so, the appropriate
inform ation is returned to the user (in this case, the minJnfo for the hierarchy). Even
if the client passes the authentication and access control test on its local server from
the groupware information stored in the cache, a cross-verification is done by the
server on the hosts where the actual database exists. Also notice th at the groupJnfo
th at originally existed on server Sm and a copy of privJnfo for the hierarchy HIER
whose original copy exists on server S r are copied on server S r . The local server S l
keeps track of the respective sites from where the copies were obtained. Also, the
sites th a t store the original copies note down th at server S l now has a copy of their
data.

5 .2 .3 A d d an O b ject to th e H ierarchy
This scenario continues the scenario shown in Figure 12. Having opened a hierar
chy, the user now tries to add an object to the hiearchy. The user is first checked for
extend privileges to the hierarchy. The scenario in Figure 13 explains how caching the
protection-related information helps in improving system performance. The request
for authentication is sent to the local server for authentication and authorization. If
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Client C

Server SL

Server Sr

Add Obiectfobi. parent)

1. HIER.Add_Object(uid, Obj, ParentObj);
2. /* Authentication performed on groupJnfo and HIER.privJnfo in the cache */
if authenticate(uid) != OK th e n
return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
, store_maxJnfo(Obj); /* Add Obj’s maxJnfo to local database */
3. HIER.addJink(uid, Obj, ParentObj); /* Request S r to place a link to the new object */
4. if authorize(uid) != OK th en
return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
HIER.addJink(Obj, ParentObj);
return(O K );
5. &: 6. return(ACK);

Figure 13: Scenario: Add object ‘O bj’ to object ‘ParentO bj’
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the user is denied the access rights to extend to the hierarchy, control is immediately
returned to the calling process. It is in situations like these th at a cache greatly
helps in reducing network traffic. However, caching of information could leave holes
in the authentication process. Hence a more careful approach is adopted. Suppose in
this case, the authentication performed based on the information in the cache goes
through successfully, then the newly extended object is added to the local database.
This does not lead to any penalty on the remote database5 encapsulated by S r in
term s of disk space. However, for every object in the hierarchy, a link has to be placed
in the hierarchy’s m i n J n f o on server S r . In order to cross-verify th a t the server S l
was not spoofing, when a request to place a link to the newly extended object is sent
to the server S r , the authentication process is carried out again before placing the
link. Though this authentication means extra CPU cycles on host R in most cases,
it helps to make sure th a t the some remote rogue process is not placing a link in the
hierarchy th a t does not need to be there.

5 .2 .4 D e le te a n O b je c t fro m th e H ie ra rc h y
This scenario is slightly different from the “Add O bject” scenario because of the
way authentication is done differently for delete and extend services. Suppose an
object “A” is created on some host R. i.e. the m a x Jn fo for the object “A” exists on
the database on host R. The authentication mechanism restricts the delete privileges
to only those users on the same host R th at have delete privileges to the hierarchy.
A user on some other host, say L, c a n n o t delete (or modify) the object “A” even
though they could belong to a group th at has the required privileges to the hierarchy.
For example, let a group G\ contain users “X@R” and “Y@L” where X and Y are
valid user accounts on hosts R and L respectively. If group G\ has delete privileges
to the hierarchy, then the object “A” can be deleted by user “X@R” because he is
5where the actual hierarchy exists
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Client C,

©
HIER.Delete Obiectfuid. A)
1. HIER.Delete_Object(uid, A); /* send request to local server */
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK th en
/* check if the request is coming from a client on the same host */
if Cm- host .address = 5#.host_address th en
begin
HIER.delete_object(A);
return(OK);
end
return(PERMISSIONJDENIED);
3. return(ACK);

Figure 14: Scenario: Delete Object “A” from hierarchy “HIER”
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a privileged user on the same host R where the maxJnfo of the object exists. User
“Y@L” cannot delete the object “A” even though he is a privileged user because he
is a rem ote user with respect to the object “A” .

5 .2 .5 A d d a group to a hierarchy
Groups for a hierarchy are encapsulated in a one-per-hierarchy object called
privJnfo. A group can be added to or deleted from a hierarchy only by the owner
of the hierarchy. Every group for a hierarchy has a set of privileges to the hierarchy.
Refer to Figure 7 for an example privJnfo object for a hierarchy. In order to add
a group to a hierarchy, the group must already be defined in the cell domain. The
example privJnfo in Figure 7 is for a hierarchy “habitat_type” th at is encapsulated
w ithin the cell “A” . The groups defined on the cell “A” as given in Figure 6 are
“adm in” , “dasl” and “eis”. If the owner of the hierarchy “habitat_type” tries to add
a group “wsal” to the hierarchy, then the operation should fail since the group “wsal”
is undefined.
Assume th at the scenario in Figure 15 occurs when some user on host P and some
user on host Q have obtained a copy of the hierarchy “HIER” under consideration.
Then a copy of the groupJnfo and privJnfo for “HIER” reside on the databases
encapsulated by Sp. and S q . So whenever an update operation is done on any of these
copies (including the original copy), the update operation has to be effected on all
other copies of groupJnfo and privJnfo for “HIER” in order to m aintain consistency.
In this scenario, the client C li directly requests the local server S l for the con
cerned service. In chapter 3, we saw th at the minJnfo for a hierarchy resides on
the database of the host where it was created. So the owner of the hierarchy should
be a valid login account on the host where the minJnfo for the hierarchy is stored.
Following this logic, the server S l makes a check to see if the server S l is the same as
S r , the site of the database for the hierarchy. If not, the user is denied access to the
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Server S q

0
1. Add_Group_to_Hier(uid, G \, HIER); /* client request to local server */
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK then
/* check if request is from a local client and if the server S l is the site of HIER */
if C l i -host -address = 5^.host-address and S l = S r then
/* add group to HIER.privJnfo in the database with the appropriate permissions */
HIER.add_group_to_hier((ji, (7i.perms);
else return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
else return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
3. send update.privinfo(HIER, new_privJnfo) request to servers S p and S q
4 . HIER.privJnfo.update(new.privJnfo); /* update cache copies of HIER.privJnfo */
5. return(ACK);

Figure 15: Scenario: Add group “G i” to hierarchy “HIER”
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“add_group_to_hier” service to the hierarchy. It is possible th at a rogue process on
some host directly connect to S r rather than to the local host. A Unix daemon pro
cess does not treat requests from local processes differently from those from remote
processes. The getpeername system call however helps identify the calling process’s
host address. By making sure th at the calling process has the same host address as
the server process, we can thus ensure th at the calling process is local to the host.
On successful authentication, the group G\ is added to the hierarchy’s privJnfo
on server S l (In this case, the local server S l is the server S r on which the hierarchy’s
m inJnfo exists). Then an update request is sent to each server (Sp and Sq) th at keep
a copy of the privJnfo object. It is im portant to note th at the copies of groupJnfo
and privJnfo are writeable only by the server th at owns the original copy and not
by any other. This is because only the owner of a hierarchy has write access to the
privJnfo object for the hierarchy and only the EIS adm inistrator has write access to
the groupJnfo object for a cell. The local server that caches this information has only
read access to the copy it owns. Any write operation on these objects performed on
a copy does not affect the original copy.

5.2 .6 A d d a user to a group
This scenario is conceptually similar to the “add_group_to_hier” scenario described
in section 5.2.5. The main difference between these two scenarios is th at this scenario
is a groupJnfo related operation while the previous scenario was a privJnfo related
scenario. And since the groupJnfo resides on the mainserver, and this operation
requests the write privilege to the groupJnfo object, the requests to this operation
has to originate on the mainserver and the EIS Adm inistrator for the cell is the
only authorized user to this operation.

The approach followed in the scenario is

otherwise similar to what has been described earlier.

Note again th at the cache

copies of groupJnfo th at exist on different hosts are writeable only via a request from
the m ainserver of the cell. All other processes (the local client processes), use this
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Server SL(=sM)

©

Server SQ

1. Add_User_to_Group(uid, U\, Gi); /* client request to local server */
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK then
/* check if request is from a local client and if the local server S l is also the mainserver S m */
if Cxi.host_address = S l -host .address and S l = S m then
/* add user Ui to group G\ in the group-info object of the cell */
group Jnfo.add_user_to_group(U\ , G\ );
else return(PERMISSION_DENIED);
else return(PERMISSION-DENIED);
3. send update_groupinfo(new.groupJnfo) request to servers Sp and S q ;
4. groupJnfo.update(new.groupJnfo); /* update cache copies of groupJnfo */
5. return(ACK);

Figure 16: Scenario: Add user “a” to group A
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cache copy for read purposes only.
It is not difficult for some rogue process to gain write privileges to cache copies.
Afterall, cache copies of groupJnfo and privJnfo on a host are owned by the server
process on the host. By m anipulating the server code, one could try to gain write
privileges on these cache copies. This however should not affect the integrity of the
original copy nor should it weaken the authentication/authorization process. The
groupJnfo and privJnfo objects in the cache are used to speed up authentication and
authorization. If a user is validated by the information in the cache, before the actual
operation is effected, a cross-check is done by validating the user against the original
copies of the groupJnfo and privJnfo objects. This works fine and does not add to
network congestion since most operations have to make remote requests to effect a
service. A uthentication/authorization can be done during this connection with the
rem ote server.

5 .2 .7 M u ltip le C lien ts on th e sam e H ost
Consider the case where a hierarchy is opened and being used by a user on some
host L and another user on the same host now issues a request to open the same
hierarchy. Here, we can take advantage of the existence of the protection related
information for the hierarchy on the local cache, rather than having to connect to
the rem ote hierarchy for each new caller. As soon as a request to open a hierarchy
reaches the local server, it checks to see if the protection information already exists in
the cache. If it does, then the authentication/authorization need be done only on this
host. On the event of a successful authorization, the local server has to connect to
the rem ote database site to retrieve the hierarchy information. Note th at we do not
cache th e hierarchy’s minJnfo since there is no significant performance improvement
in doing so. However, every tim e any EIS service is requested, we go through a process
of authenticating/authorizing the user. Since groupJnfo and privJnfo are the objects
encapsulating this process, we find it beneficial to cache these objects.
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Client C|_

Client C L2

Server S,

Server S,
1. Get_Hierarchy(uid, HIER, R);
2. if authenticate(uid) = OK th en
/* Note down user-id and process id of all clients using HIER. */
HIER.ref_list.add(uid, pid);
3. Get_min_info(HIER);
4. if authorize(uid) = OK th e n
re t urn(m in Jnfo);
5. re t urn(m in Jnfo);

Figure 17: Scenario: Multiple Clients on the same Host

Server S

Server S

Close HierarchvfHIEm

1. Close_Hierarchy(HIER);
2. delete HIER.privJnfo;
delete groupJnfo;
3. delete_site-from_list(L); /* asynchronous request
4. S m ' groupJnfo.siteJist.delete(L);
S r : HIER.privJnfo.siteJist.delete(L);

no reply */

Figure 18: Scenario: Close Hierarchy
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5 .2 .8 C lose H ierarchy
It is necessary and im portant to keep data in the cache only for as long as it is
required. As long as an object is cached, every update operation on th at object will
have to be passed on to all the copies th at exist out there on the network so as to
m aintain consistency among the copies. So when a user chooses to close an open
hierarchy, we have to do a cache cleanup operation. The “close_hierarchy” request
is forwarded6 to the local server S l • The local server deletes its copy of groupJnfo
and privJnfo for the hierarchy and issues asynchronous requests to servers Sm and
S r telling them th at the copies of group-info and privJnfo respectively are deleted.

Servers Sm and S r then remove the host entry L from the site list th at keeps track
of the hosts m aintaining a copy of the concerned information. However, in the event
of m ultiple clients using the same hierarchy and hence the same data in the cache,
it becomes necessary th at we keep some sort of reference count to check the number
of active clients referencing the cache information. In order to deal with this, the
server is made to m aintain a reference list to an opened hierarchy. The reference
list keeps track of the process-ids of the processes th at have opened the hierarchy
along with a latest-use tim e-stam p. The time-stam p helps identify the last time the
process m ade a service request for the hierarchy. The tim e-stam p also helps recover
from situations where the client ptim e-stam p also helps recover from situations where
the client process dies abnormally.

5.3 C o n sisten cy
Consistency is one of the key issues in a system where replication of data is being
done. In EIS, the replicated information in the cache is writeable only by one process.
The groupJnfo cache object is writeable only by the m ainserver process in the cell
domain and the privJnfo cache object for a hierarchy is writeable only by the server
6The client need not wait for the return value of this request. It just closes the hierarchy window
and issues an asynchronous one-way request to S l
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where th e hierarchy’s minJnfo is stored. All clients on the local host can use these
cache objects in read-only mode. These factors make consistency among these objects
easier to implement. In this section, we shall verify consistency of a replicated object
and th a t of a requested service by looking at some scenarios with the read/read,
read/w rite issues into consideration. The w rite/w rite situation never occurs since the
replicated objects are writeable only by the server th at owns the original copy of the
object.
In the read/read situation, we can think of two processes reading from its local
copy of the object. This does not affect the integrity of the replicated objects and
hence nothing need be done to ensure consistency.
Let us consider a read/w rite situation. This is a situation when an update opera
tion is effected by some process on an object A and another process on some other host
has already read its local copy of the object, A L, to perform some service before the
update object request reaches object A L. In section 5.2.5 and 5.2.6, we discussed some
example scenarios where an update operation needs to be propogated to all those
servers where a cache copy of the concerned object exists. Let us look at another sce
nario, “delete_user_from_group” , whose object diagram is exactly similar to th at in
th e scenario in section 5.2.6. Let’s suppose th at the user X@L, who belongs to group
Gi, has the all the privileges th at reside with G\. The group G\ is assumed to have
delete rights to the hierarchy HIER. In this scenario, the “delete_user_from_group”
request can be issued only by the EIS A dm inistrator and hence the update groupJnfo
request originates on the m ainserver of the cell. If the user X@L now requests the
“delete_object” service to an object in HIER before the “update groupJnfo” request
reaches the replicated object g ro u p J n fo L, then we have a consistency problem in
th e requested service. The user X@L passes the authentication/authorization test
on the local copy of groupJnfo, g r o u p J n fo L, even though he actually no longer is a
user to the group G\ and hence cannot delete an object in the hierarchy. However,
if we look back at the authentication mechanism used in EIS, we find th at in the
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event of successful authentication of a user against a local copy, a service requested
is granted to the user only after authenticating him against the original copy of the
groupware information. Hence in this scenario, the “delete_object” request has to be
propogated to the m ainserver for authentication before the service is granted, thus
ensuring consistency of the service.
We argued th at a w rite/w rite situation never occurs. While this is true under
normal circumstances, it is not impossible for a rogue to m anipulate the replicated
object on his host.

In such a scenario, even though the consistency between the

different copies of an object cannot be guaranteed, the validity of the original object
and the services provided by another server are not compromised.

5.4 C lien t crashes
As noted in the “Close Hierarchy” scenario, the life of data in a cache is de
term ined by the existence of clients using that information. The reference-list th at
m aintains the process ids of all the client processes using a cache object helps de
term ine th e processes still using a cache object. As soon as a client closes an open
hierarchy, the process entry is removed from the reference-list. The data in the cache
is physically removed when the last process entry is removed from the reference list.
However, if a client process dies before closing an open hierarchy, then there is a
reference to the process in the reference-list th at will never be removed and the cache
object would continue to live forever leading, to unnecessary network communication
overhead whenever the cache needs to be updated. To solve this problem, the server
th a t keeps a local copy is made to periodically look up the process table to find if
every client process in the reference-list is still alive. If any client process was found
to be no longer in the process table, then its entry is deleted from the reference list.
This ensures th a t the copy exists in the cache only as long as it needs to be there.

6. S u m m ary and C on clu sion
In Chapter 1, we discussed the need for a security mechanism for EIS th at would
provide a reliable authentication scheme and guarantee the coherence of the database
against rogueish behaviour. Chapter 3 presents the design of the groupware layer
for EIS. The groupware layer was designed using the object-oriented methedology.
The design of a groupware layer for EIS was considerably different from th at for
a monolithic system. A detailed study of the organization of the different objects
relevant to the groupware layer and how they fit into EIS were discussed in Chapter
3. When designing any network security mechanism, the most im portant concern is
the way authentication is done. Only if we are able to identify correctly to whom we
are talking, can we determine what access privileges th at user can have. Chapter 4
deals with a careful study of various popular authentication mechanisms such as that
used in “rlogin” and “rsh”, ident and kerberos and presents a viable authentication
mechanism for EIS. Chapter 4 also discusses the authorization and access control
aspects of the groupware layer. Based on the design of the groupware layer presented
in Chapters 3 and 4, a series of scenarios were presented in Chapter 5. The scenarios
were a means of viewing different design issues and helped greatly in designing the
right approach for implementation in EIS.

6.1 Im p lem en ta tio n S ta tu s
EIS 1.0 supports the groupware layer and is fully functional. The implementation
follows the design discussed in this thesis. EIS is currently supported on IBM/RS6000
workstations and runs on AIX 3.2. The code is written in C + + and the client/server
communication system is implemented using the SUN RPC 4.0. The code should
be portable to a wide range of Unix workstations within the portability bounds of
different C + + compilers, X /M otif library implementations and the SUN RPC. EIS is
presently populated with enough database information to illustrate both its use and
its value to potential users.
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The groupJnfo object encapsulating the authentication information for users in a
cell exists on th e m ainserver of the cell. Since this is by far the most frequently used
object in EIS, we use a shared memory implementation of the object thereby keeping
it in shared memory on the m ainserver at all times. This helps speedier access
to authentication and also eases coding the operations performed on the groupJnfo
object. Also since there is only one groupJnfo object per cell, there are not too many
shared memory segments kept floating in the machines.

6.2 D irectio n s for Further R esearch
The im plem entation does not include the caching concept discussed in the scenar
ios presented in Chapter 5. The goal ,of the groupware design was to first design a
security mechanism th a t was reliable and helped provide controlled access to the EIS
database and then consider implementing features th at improved the system perfor
mance. The present im plem entation provides all the functional features necessary in
a security system. Migrating from the present system to one including the caching
concept should not affect the end-user in any way and the process is upward com
patible. EIS is still in a rudim entary stage with a limited user community. As the
num ber of users using EIS increases, the design details presented here should form
the basis for a consideration of the finer design issues. The future designer can pay
more attention to th e caching concept and come up with a reliable coherence scheme
for im plem entation in EIS. Another feature that could be very helpful is to design
appropriate replication algorithms to replicate the EIS databases on multiple systems.
As the user community grows across the network, making far and remote requests
for database resourses could greatly reduce the performance. Replication algorithms
help the end-user to connect to the nearest database server and hence speed up access
times.
The present authentication mechanism does not use the more recent popular au
thentication schemes such as kerberos and public key authentication. The ultim ate
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goal is to be able to use a DCE-based implementation of EIS to provide a reliable
and robust security mechanism. As DCE gains popularity and becomes available on
m ultiple platforms more easily, a port of EIS to a DCE-based implem entation is most
desirable. Newer versions of SUN RPC also claim to provide a more robust security
mechanism. Also they should be freely available on many platforms. An upgrade
of the present system to one using the newer version of SUN RPC might also help
improving the authentication in EIS.
EIS 1.0 does not support any kind of recovery from server crashes. If a server
servicing requests to an EIS database crashes, then that database remains unaccessible until the server is restarted and starts functioning normally again. The future
researcher could explore possibilities of implementing more graceful server recovery
from crashes. One possible approach could be to keep a log of the current state of
the server. Upon a server crash, the server could be initialized to the previous state
as noted in the log and proceed from there. Another, more reliable apporach, could
be to consider replication algorithms to replicate the EIS database so th at there are
more than just one server providing services to a database. Such a system not only
speeds up access times by allowing the user to connect to the nearest database server,
but also provides fault-tolerance.

A p p en d ix A
P seu d o co d e for A u th en tica tin g a U ser
authenticate(user X) /* begin authentication for create group */
b e g in
getpeername(socket_descriptor, &remote_host_address, &remote_port)
if (X.host-address != remoteJxost_address) th e n
return(F A L S E );
p rocJnfoJist = getprocinfo();
w h ile (procJnfo != NULL)
b e g in
if procJnfo.program_name = “e is” th e n
if procJnfo.userJd = X .userJd th e n
retu rn (T R U E );
procJnfo = procJnfoJist .next;
end
return(F A L S E );
end

Figure 19: A uthenticate User X
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A p p en d ix B
In sta llation G uide for EIS
P r o d u c t D escrip tio n
The Ecosystem Information System (EIS) is an object-oriented distributed system
containing various types of information of interest to ecosystem modelers and m an
agers. EIS 1.0 is presently supported on the IBM RS6000s. Successful installation of
EIS 1.0 on your system will require:
AIX XL C + + 1.1 or AIX C + + Set 2.0
X /M otif
ONC RPC 4.0 library

EIS comes in two parts: EIS client and EIS Server. EIS client can be used by the
user to gain access to the EIS repository. EIS server runs as a daemon process on
each active EIS host.
EIS can be downloaded in two ways:
1. If your system is an IBM RS6000 and your machine does not support any one
or more of the above mentioned libraries, then you can download the executables in
binary mode. The three files to download are
eis

(The client executable)

eis_svc

(The server executable)

eisJnstall

(The server installation script)

2. If your system supports the above libraries, then download “eis.tar.Z” into the
directory where you want to install this software and execute the following commands.
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If you were in SOMEJDIR directory when you executed the above commands,
there will be an “eis” directory created under it. This will be your EIS base directory
(henceforth named as EISDIR) he. SOM E-DIR/eis is the same as EISDIR. The
directory structure within EISDIR is shown later in this section.
After the EISDIR have been created, the next step is to build all the executables
required for the EIS system. In order to do this, go to the EISDIR directory, and
execute the command:
% make all
This will build the following executables
E ISD IR /d.clnt/eis

(The client executable)

EISDIR/d.server/eis-svc

(The server executable)

E IS D IR /d.server/eisinstall

(The server installation script)

In order to use EIS on your host, you will have to first install the server as a
daemon process, “eisin stall” is an installation script to install the server on your
machine. The server on your machine has to know:
1) The path of the directory where the EIS database on this host exists.

For

example, you can specify EISD IR /d.data as the database path.
2) The EIS Main Server for this host. The Main Server is one that maintains
a list of database sites and database hierarchies. An existing main server is:
m e g g e rs .c s .u m t.e d u .

You could choose to name your host as your main

server in which case the database will have nothing to start with. However you
can connect to any of the other sites through the client interface.
3) The EIS adm inistrator for this site. [ This is necessary only if you choose your
site as the main server]. The person installing EIS is automatically chosen as
the EIS adm inistrator.
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Once you have made sure th a t the EIS Main Server and your local EIS Server
are running, any user can access the database by running EISD IR /d.clnt/eis. It is
advisable to include EISD IR/d.clnt in your PATH environment variable so th at eis
can be started just by typing “eis”.
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